Behaviorism and Naturalism* by Hatfield, Gary
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
IRCS Technical Reports Series Institute for Research in Cognitive Science
January 2001
Behaviorism and Naturalism*
Gary Hatfield
University of Pennsylvania, hatfield@phil.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/ircs_reports
University of Pennsylvania Institute for Research in Cognitive Science Technical Report No. IRCS-01-06.
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/ircs_reports/22
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Hatfield, Gary, "Behaviorism and Naturalism*" (2001). IRCS Technical Reports Series. 22.
http://repository.upenn.edu/ircs_reports/22
Behaviorism and Naturalism*
Abstract
Behaviorism as a school of psychology was founded by John B. Watson, and grew into the neobehaviorisms of
the 1920s, 30s and 40s. Philosophers were involved from the start, prefiguring the movement and endeavoring
to define or redefine its tenets. Behaviorism expressed the naturalistic bent in American thought, which
opposed the then prevailing philosophical idealism and was inspired by developments in natural science itself,
especially biology. This naturalism was not materialistic; it viewed mind as a part of nature from a Darwinian
and functionalist perspective. Although Watson adopted a strict materialism, other behaviorists, including
Tolman, Hull, and Skinner, were biologically oriented and rejected materialism and physicalist reduction.
After the 1940s the character of philosophical naturalism in America changed. The physicalism of some logical
empiricists and Quine became prominent, and behaviorism was philosophically reinterpreted in physicalist
terms.
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                                   Behaviorism and Naturalism*
                                          Gary Hatfield
                                    University of Pennsylvania
          Behaviorism was a peculiarly American phenomenon.  As a school of psychology
          it was founded by John B. Watson (1878-1958), and grew into the
          neobehaviorisms of the 1920s, 30s and 40s.  Philosophers were involved from
          the start, prefiguring the movement and endeavoring to define or redefine its
          tenets.  Behaviorism expressed the naturalistic bent in American thought,
          which came in response to the prevailing philosophical idealism and was
          inspired by developments in natural science itself.
               There were several versions of naturalism in American philosophy, and
          also several behaviorisms (Williams 1931, O’Neil 1995).  Most behaviorists
          paid homage to Darwinian functionalism; all forswore introspection and made
          learned changes in behavior the primary subject matter and explanatory domain
          of psychology.  Most behaviorists acknowledged that scientists begin from
          their own conscious experience, but denied that such experience could be an
          object of science or a source of evidence in psychology.  They differed in
          their descriptions of behavior, modes of explanation, and attitudes toward
          mentalistic concepts.  Watson was a strict materialist who wanted to eliminate
          all mentalistic talk from psychology.  Edward Chace Tolman (1886-1959)
          regarded mind as a biological function of the organism.  He permitted
          mentalistic terms such as ’purpose’ in behavioral description, and posited
          intervening processes that included ’representations’ of the environment,
          while requiring such processes be studied only as expressed in behavior.
          Clark L. Hull (1884-1952) developed a hypothetical-deductive version of
          _________________________
          *Forthcoming as Chapter 53 of Thomas Baldwin (ed.), _C_a_m_b_r_i_d_g_e _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _o_f
          _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y: _1_8_7_0-_1_9_4_5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
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          behaviorism, akin to Tolman’s functionalism in positing intervening variables
          but without his cognitivist constructs.  B. F. Skinner (1904-90) rejected
          intervening variables and developed his own account of the behavior of the
          whole organism, based on the laws of operant conditioning.
               The naturalism in American philosophy of the early twentieth century
          showed respect for the natural sciences, especially biology and psychology.
          John Dewey (1896, 1911), George Santayana (1905, 1920), and F. J. E.
          Woodbridge (1909, 1913) expressed this attitude.  It animated the neorealism
          of E. B. Holt and Ralph Barton Perry (Holt et al., 1912), who gave special
          attention to psychology, and the evolutionary naturalism and critical realism
          of Roy Wood Sellars (1916, 1922).  This naturalism differed from Watson’s in
          regarding mind as part of nature from a Darwinian and functionalist
          perspective, and treating behavior as the product of the mental functioning.
          It fed Tolman’s version of behaviorism.  It was not materialistic or
          physical-reductionist.  Only later, with Quine and logical empiricism, was
          behaviorism seen as essentially physicalistic.
                                Birth of Behaviorism in Psychology
          After the turn of the century there was increasing interest in behavior as a
          subject matter and form of evidence in psychology, and as an objective
          expression of mind.  Philosophers and psychologists both were growing
          skeptical of introspection as a method for knowing mind.  They believed
          traditional introspection had to rely on a shaky inference from analogy to
          extend its first-person results to other humans and to animals.  Among
          philosophers, Perry (1909) and E. A. Singer (1911) promoted behavior as a
          means of perceiving mental functioning in humans that allegedly would not
          depend on introspection and analogy.  Psychologists (e.g., Warren 1914),
          partly prompted by biological study of animal behavior (e.g., Jennings 1906),
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          called for greater attention to ’objective’ factors in human psychology (see
          Chapter 8).  Behavioral evidence was touted by the comparative psychologists
          Thorndike (1898), Washburn (1908), and Yerkes (1907), but despite Yerkes’s
          claim to the contrary (1917, p. 155), that did not make them behaviorists, for
          they used such evidence to frame theories of the traditional subject matter of
          psychology, consciousness or mind regarded as an object of introspection.
               Other psychologists argued that the very subject matter of psychology
          should be changed, from consciousness to behavior.  William McDougall (1905,
          1912), then at Oxford, and Walter Pillsbury (1911) at Michigan proposed to
          define psychology as the science of ’conduct’ or ’behavior’.  But they did not
          ban introspective methods for finding the mental causes of behavior (McDougall
          1905, p. 2; Pillsbury 1911, p. 5), and McDougall was an avowed dualist (1911,
          chap. 26).  Behaviorism did not arise from making behavior the primary
          evidence or subject matter of psychology.  It arose from a strict repudiation
          of introspective methods and a proposed change in the theoretical vocabulary
          of psychology.
               Behaviorism as a self-conscious movement was initiated by Watson in two
          articles (1913a&b) and two books (1914, 1919).  He proposed changing
          psychology’s subject matter, evidence, and theoretical vocabulary.  The
          subject matter would now be behavior, described as muscle movements and
          glandular secretions; the evidence would be this same behavior, along with a
          physical description of the stimulus setting; the theoretical vocabulary of
          reflex arcs and Pavlovian conditioned learning would be used to explain
          stimulus-response relations.  Animals were to be regarded as complex machines
          whose current behavioral propensities are a function of innate structure and
          previous stimulus exposure.  Instinct was to be minimized, and could perhaps
          be explained through Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characteristics (1914,
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          p. 174).  What a complex animal does is primarily a function of its reactional
          or conditioning biography, that is, its history of observable pairings of
          stimulus and response.  While Watson believed that the chain of events from
          stimulus to response would eventually be accounted for in purely physical-
          chemical terms, he offered behaviorism as the science that would presently
          lead to the prediction and control of animal behavior.  Behaviorism differs
          from physiology in studying the responses of the whole organism, but Watson
          permitted postulation of unobserved physiological states (glandular or
          muscular).  Nonetheless, everything of importance is in principle available at
          the periphery of the organism; ’there are no centrally initiated processes’
          (1913a, p. 423).  Behaviorist principles apply to humans and other animals
          alike.  If one must account for the processes previously labeled ’thought’ in
          humans, they should be seen as laryngeal subvocalizations (again, in principle
          detectable at the surface of the throat).  Emotions are to be equated with
          glandular secretions and genital tumescence.  Perception is a matter of
          sensory discrimination as manifested through differential behavioral response,
          including, for humans, verbal response.
               As Heidbreder observed, Watson wanted to extend ’the methods and point of
          view of animal psychology into human psychology’ (1933, p. 236).  It was not
          just any animal psychology, but the mechanistic version propounded by Jacques
          Loeb, who taught Watson at Chicago (where he took his Ph.D. after studying
          philosophy and psychology at Furman University in Greenville, South Carolina).
          Loeb (1900) considered himself a biologist and an opponent of ’comparative
          psychology’, which drew analogies between human and animal cognition based
          upon introspection.  Even the animal biologist H. S. Jennings (1906), at Johns
          Hopkins when Watson arrived in 1908, permitted attribution of consciousness
          down the phylogenetic scale to amoeba and paramecium.  Watson’s comparative
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          psychology, and his general psychology of humans, were to be of the Loeb
          style--mechanistic, materialist, and deterministic, and for that reason
          presumably objective and scientific.  Watson left Hopkins in 1920 and went
          into advertising, where he flourished.  When after 1930 he withdrew from
          psychology behaviorism was on the way up; the young Skinner (1976, p. 299) and
          W. V. O. Quine (1985, p. 110) had already been drawn to Watson’s variety.
                               Philosophical and Critical Responses
          Watson’s articles drew immediate response from both psychologists and
          philosophers.  Sustained discussion occurred in the _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_c_a_l _R_e_v_i_e_w and
          the _J_o_u_r_n_a_l _o_f _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y, _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y _a_n_d _S_c_i_e_n_t_i_f_i_c _M_e_t_h_o_d_s (which published
          psychological articles and results even after abbreviating its name in 1921).
          Titchener 1914 argued that Watson’s new movement was not really new.  Its
          criticisms of introspection could be found in Comte and Maudsley (see Chapter
          8).  Its positive teaching should be seen as a continuation of the biological
          study of animal behavior, something Titchener welcomed, including its
          extension to humans, but which he believed neither could nor should replace
          mentalistic psychology.  Angell 1913 was more favorably disposed to the new
          movement, though he refused to forgo introspection.
               Among philosophers, Dewey 1914, Holt 1915, and De Laguna 1916, 1918
          praised the new movement.  An enthusiastic Holt was all but prepared to do
          away with introspective methods.  Dewey believed mind is best studied as it
          functions purposively to adjust organism to environment.  De Laguna developed
          this functionalist outlook but she was unwilling to preclude introspection.
          All agreed in seeing behavior as the expression of mind.  None was prepared to
          reject mentalistic descriptions of behavior.  Holt and Dewey argued that
          behavioral acts are unified as expressions of purpose.  The behavior of an
          animal that moves about and then eats when it finds food expresses the fact
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          that the animal was looking for food.  Holt argued that such ’objective
          reference’ of behavior is too often neglected.  Such reference may be to
          things that do not exist, that existed only in the past, or that will exist in
          the future (Holt 1915 [1915, pp. 172-3]).
               The notions of purpose and objective reference in behavior were developed
          by Perry (1918, 1921a&b).  Perry approvingly saw behaviorism as a return to
          the Aristotelian view that ’mind and body are related as activity and organ’
          (1921a, p. 85).  According to the usual introspectivist, who adopts
          psychophysical parallelism, the mind simply ’supervenes’ on physiological
          events; but for the behaviorist the mind ’intervenes’ between stimulus and
          response (1921a, p. 87).  Behaviorism closes the gap between mind and body.
          Perry did not rule out introspection, and he claimed the behaviorist did not
          either (citing De Laguna 1916).  He believed behavioral evidence enlarged the
          data of psychology, and that behaviorism would yield improved psychological
          explanations.  Consider his discussion of psychological dispositions, whether
          ’instincts’ or Freudian ’complexes’.  He regarded such dispositions as
          nonconscious and considered three types of explanation for them.  They could
          be mental and not physiological, a possibility he found nonsensical for
          unconscious states; they could be physiological and nonmental; or, ’accepting
          the behavioristic version of mind, one may regard dispositions as both
          physical and mental: physical because consisting in certain physiological
          structures, mental because of the peculiar type of function or activity in
          which these structures are engaged’ (1921a, p. 94).  Perry used the same
          notion of disposition to analyze purposive action, which he found to consist
          of a ’set’ or ’determining tendency’ to pursue a course of action in
          appropriate environmental circumstances, bringing in ’auxiliary responses’ as
          needed to achieve the desired end.  Such dispositions toward purposive action
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          are linked conditionally to cognitive states such as beliefs, which are
          ’suppositions’ about environmental circumstances ascribed to organisms in
          virtue of their dispositions to behave (1921b).
               Bertrand Russell adopted the view that behavior is an expression of mind
          in Russell 1921, a work that attempted to solve the mind-body problem through
          the neutral monism of James and the neorealism of Holt and Perry, hence one
          that did not preclude introspection.  He spoke approvingly of Watsonian
          behaviorism throughout Russell 1927, again retaining introspection as the
          means of knowing the ontologically neutral ’data’ of both physics and
          psychology.  Woodbridge (1921, 1925) argued that behavior is inherently
          teleological and so must be understood in relation to ends.  His position was
          consonant with earlier functionalism and with Perry’s recent work.
          Psychological critics of behaviorism cited these and other philosophical
          discussions (see Roback 1923, chaps. 3-7).  Such critics charged Watson with
          using a double standard in denying theoretical posits to the mentalists while
          invoking unseen physiological states, argued that behaviorist descriptions
          tacitly rely on the psychologist’s own introspective knowledge, predicted
          Watson’s account of learning would be shown factually inadequate, and
          questioned whether his talk of muscle twitches and glandular secretions could
          effectively describe behavior without Holt’s notion of ’objective reference’.
                       Neobehaviorism and Philosophy: Tolman, Hull, Skinner
          Behaviorism became the leading school of scientific psychology through the
          research and theorizing of the neobehaviorists, notably Tolman, Hull, and
          Skinner.  None were simple stimulus-response reflexologists; all considered
          behavior to be a function of variables beyond previous and current
          stimulation.  All were methodologically reflective and philosophically
          engaged.  Tolman and Hull were strongly influenced by American neorealism and
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          pragmatist functionalism.  Hull took theoretical and methodological
          inspiration from philosophical and scientific classics, especially Hume’s
          associationism and the deductive exposition of Newton’s _P_r_i_n_c_i_p_i_a.  Skinner
          came to behaviorism through Russell 1927, his philosophical outlook being
          further shaped by Mach 1912 [1919], Poincar’e 1902, and the operationism of P.
          W. Bridgman 1927.  As neobehaviorism was coming to maturity, the logical
          empiricists alleged that all psychological statements can be translated into
          physical statements referring to physical states of a person’s body (Carnap
          1932, affirming epistemological solidarity with American behaviorism; Carnap
          1935, pp. 88-99; Hempel 1935).  The neobehaviorists took note of the
          scientific philosophy of the Vienna Circle and its Berlin allies, but it was
          not formative of or influential on their positions (see Smith 1986).
               Tolman studied psychology at Harvard, with instruction from Holt and
          Perry.  He converted to behaviorism after going to Berkeley, where he spent
          his career, producing laboratory studies of maze-learning in rats, theoretical
          and methodological papers (collected in Tolman 1951a), and a major book
          (1932).  He adopted an avowedly nonmetaphysical, pragmatist stance in
          metaphysics and epistemology (1932, chap. 25), and did not deny the existence
          of ’raw feels’ or qualia accessible to individuals.  From early on he
          characterized Watson’s brand of behaviorism as a ’muscle twitchism’ directed
          at the ’molecular’ behavior of muscle contractions and glandular secretions.
          Tolman (1932, chap. 1) argued that even molecular behaviorism must rely on
          ’molar’ descriptions of what animals do as whole organisms interacting with
          their environments (something Watson had acknowledged in other terms, 1919, p.
          13). Believing that effective behavior classification requires consideration
          of the animal’s purpose or end, Tolman advocated a ’purposive behaviorism’
          (with credit to Holt and Perry).  He regarded the inherent teleology of
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          behavior as a biological and psychological fact.  His work with rats in mazes,
          including their running into walls when a shortened path was substituted for a
          previously longer one, led him to attribute ’cognitive postulations’,
          ’expectations’, and ’representations’ to rats (1926, 1927 [1951a, pp. 60,
          65]).  These representations might be of objects that no longer exist, thereby
          exhibiting intentionality (see Amundson 1983).  In response to Gestalt
          psychology, Tolman came to attribute ’sign-Gestalt expectations’ to his
          animals, consisting of a sign-object perceived as standing in a means-end
          relation to a signified object or state of affairs.  Inspired by Bridgman
          1927, he developed the notion of ’intervening variables’ as operationally-
          defined internal states of animals (listed in Tolman 1938 [1951a] as demand,
          appetite, sensory differentiation, motor skill, hypotheses, and biases),
          which, together with stimulation, heredity, maturity, physiological drive, and
          previous training, combine to yield a response.  For Tolman such intervening
          variables were realistically interpreted and not reducible to a purely
          physical or (positivistic) observational language.  Intervening variables are
          defined in relation to observable features of the animal’s environment and
          behavior, described (as he thought they must be) in the functionalist language
          of purpose.  When MacCorquodale and Meehl (1948) proposed that ’intervening
          variables’ be viewed as merely empirical correlations and that ’hypothetical
          construct’ be used when internal entities or processes are posited, Tolman
          (1951b) explained that his intervening variables were hypothesized processes
          and states of the organism proper to psychology, not requiring physiological
          interpretation to be classed as hypothetical constructs (though he was newly
          tolerant of neurophysiological hypotheses, Tolman 1949).
               Although Tolman’s self-classification as a behaviorist was questioned
          (Harrell and Harrison 1938), it became widely accepted (Williams 1931,
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          Woodworth 1948, O’Neil 1995).  In the 1920s many saw behaviorism as rendering
          study of mental activity objective, by substituting behavioral for
          introspective evidence.  Hull and Skinner insisted on more austere
          vocabularies for describing such evidence than Tolman, though without
          returning to Watsonian twitchism.
               Unlike Tolman, Hull was an avowed materialist, adopting the working
          hypothesis that the organism can be wholly described within a ’physical or
          mechanistic’ view (1930, 1937 [1984, pp. 140, 319]).  He was not an
          eliminativist regarding conscious phenomena, but his vision of behavioral
          science excluded introspective methods.  He allowed mentalistic language such
          as ’goal response’ into his system, but unlike Tolman demanded it be
          rigorously defined in pure stimulus-response language containing no
          mentalistic terms (and no intentional notions).  Hull earned his Ph.D. at
          Wisconsin in 1918 and taught there until moving to Yale in 1929.  At first
          interested in hypnosis and mental testing, he converted to behaviorism while
          teaching it in seminars during the mid-1920s (using Watson 1924 and Roback
          1923 as texts).  At Yale he produced a series of important papers (collected
          in Hull 1984) and two major books (1943, 1952).  He conceived the organism in
          a functionalist and Darwinian framework; he took Newtonian physics as his
          model of theory structure, with definitions, postulates, and theorems.  He is
          best known for his highly formalized theory of learning or ’habit strength’.
          He identified himself as a ’molar’ behaviorist, arguing that behavior theory
          could progress despite the lack of knowledge in neurophysiology, and granting
          behavioral science its own observational and theoretical vocabulary.  At the
          same time, he treated intervening variables such as ’drive’ (e.g., hunger) or
          ’need reduction’ as referring to as-yet-unknown neural states.  Hull was
          familiar with Carnap 1935, but did not interpret his theoretical apparatus
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          using the analyses of theory and observation proposed by the Vienna Circle.
          Later interpreters retrospectively characterized his position in that light
          (e.g., Bergmann and Spence 1941, Spence 1944, Feigl 1951, Koch 1954), thereby
          eliding his materialistic realism (see Amundson and Smith 1984).
               Like Tolman and Hull, Skinner wanted to produce a science of behavior
          together with an account (or ’philosophy’) of that science.  He absorbed
          Machian positivism before and after arriving at Harvard in 1928 to study
          psychology, adopting Mach’s anti-metaphysical inductivism, his focus on
          biological adjustment, and his suspicion of posited theoretical entities.  For
          a time Skinner wanted to marry this Machian bent with Bridgman’s operationism.
          Then he came to see operationism in psychology as allied with logical
          positivism, and so as overly formal and physicalistic (1938, 1945).  Skinner
          rejected mind and any mentalistic talk that could not be translated into
          neutral behavioral descriptions.  But he did not think behaviorist psychology
          should be reduced to physiology or that its descriptions should be restated in
          physical language, and he was unenthusiastic about the unity of science.  He
          avoided materialism because it led to prejudice against the behavioral level
          of analysis and in favor of concrete physical states of the organism (1938,
          chaps. 12-13).  He was a molar behaviorist who sought to discover the laws of
          behavioral change.  He rejected intervening variables of any kind (causing his
          behaviorism to be dubbed that of an ’empty’ or ’hollow’ organism), looking
          instead for empirical correlations among empirically determined factors such
          as stimulus, response, reinforcer, and hours of deprivation (of food, water,
          etc.).  He emphasized Thorndikian conditioning, that is, behavioral changes
          occurring when reinforcement (getting food or another reinforcer) is
          contingent upon a particular type of response ’emitted’ by the organism (such
          as pressing a bar or pecking a target).  His most noted results related the
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          speed and permanence of learning to schedules of reinforcement (Ferster and
          Skinner 1957).  Skinner spent the mid-1930s in the Society of Fellows at
          Harvard, then held positions at Minnesota and Indiana before returning to
          Harvard in 1947.  He extended his behavioristic analysis to perception and
          language, where his efforts were superseded by perceptual psychologists and
          linguists.  He lived to see the behavioristic revolution replaced by new
          cognitive approaches inspired by work on perception, memory, and attention,
          and influenced by communication theory and the rise of computer science,
          linguistics, and artificial intelligence.
                               Behaviorism and American Naturalism
          The main movements in American philosophy during the first third of the
          century, pragmatism, neorealism, and critical realism, were naturalistic
          (Perry 1912, Sellars 1916).  They foresaw extending the cognitive practices of
          the sciences to all inquiry.  These philosophies were not physicalistic or
          materialistic.  They numbered biology and psychology among the sciences, and
          included biological and psychological phenomena, imbued with teleology and
          known through introspection, within the sphere of the natural.  This was
          naturalism without materialism (Dewey, Hook, and Nagel 1945).  This sort of
          naturalism was critical of Watsonian behaviorism as narrow-mindedly denying
          plain facts of nature (Pepper 1923, Woodbridge 1925).  Mind was to be
          integrated into nature, not excluded from it (Dewey 1925, chaps. 6-8).  This
          sort of naturalism was embraced by Tolman, but Hull and Skinner agreed only
          with its general biological orientation.  Their neobehaviorisms shaped the
          perception of American behaviorism in later decades, while Tolman came to be
          seen as a predecessor of the newer cognitive approaches.
               After the 1940s the character of philosophical naturalism in America
          changed.  The physicalism of some logical empiricists and Quine became
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          prominent.  Behaviorism was philosophically reinterpreted in physicalist
          terms.  The biological bent of earlier American naturalism and the
          functionalism of neobehaviorism were thereby masked.  These developments
          conditioned retrospective interpretations of the philosophical context of
          behaviorism in the first half of the century, though they themselves belong to
          the history of philosophy after mid-century.
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